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Abstract 
 This paper argues that Qatar exercises soft power influence in a 
troubled region via attraction and “carrots”. The sources of attraction 
includes: Qatar’s political stability derived from its military alliance with the 
U.S and effective income redistribution policies and a progressive higher 
education system which have greatly enhanced the stature of Qatar in the 
Middle East. Qatar offers the following “carrots” for influence: the potency 
of its Aljazeera Network, “carrot diplomacy”, sports investments and a 
generous foreign aid policy. However, the efficacy of these tools could be 
undermined, by the lack of a democratic culture in Qatar, questionable 
associations and causes, the unsustainable trajectory of “carrot” diplomacy 
and a creeping shift towards hard power in resolving conflicts and its 
attendant backlash. 
Keywords: Qatar, hard power, soft power, diplomacy, Arab Spring, Middle 
East 
 
Introduction 
 This paper seeks to explore how Qatar exerts soft power influence in 
its foreign policy and its attendant challenges. Since Joseph Nye pioneered 
the concept of soft power, there have been numerous articles on how 
countries are exerting soft power influence. However, most of these articles 
have disproportionately focused on the same traditional great powers that 
dominate international politics in the exercise of hard power such as the U.S, 
China, Russia and other European powers. Thus the focus on Qatar offers a 
departure from a great power exercising any form of power and demonstrates 
how a small country can punch above its weight by exerting soft power 
influence and shaping the course of history in the Middle East.  
 Joseph Nye defines soft power as “the ability to affect others to 
obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or 
European Scientific Journal   November 2013  edition vol.9, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
351 
payment.”101 Nye notes that “one can affect other’s behavior in three main 
ways: threats of coercion (sticks), inducements and payments (‘carrots’), and 
attraction that makes others want what you want.”102 Also, soft-power relies 
on three main resources: cultural - places where it is attractive; political 
values -when the promoter adheres to them at home and abroad; and foreign 
policies- regarded as legitimate and having moral authority103. In this regard, 
this paper argues that Qatar relies on attraction and “carrots” in its exercise 
of soft power. Qatar’s relative political stability in a turbulent region derived 
from a strong military alliance with the U.S and the effective redistribution 
of wealth among its citizens constitute a major source of attraction within its 
sphere of influence in the Middle East. In addition, the image of the 
Aljazeera media network as the voice of the powerless coupled with a 
progressive higher educational system is shaping the hearts and minds of 
thousands of people within the region. In terms of “carrots”, the volume and 
scope of Qatar’s foreign aid, sports investments and “carrot” diplomatic 
efforts is a major boost for its attempt at soft power. However, these could be 
derailed by the following: creeping utilization of “sticks” in the form of 
military intervention in Libya and Syria, questionable associations and 
causes, the unsustainable trajectory of “carrot” diplomacy and the risk of 
negative backlash. 
 
Soft Power by Attraction 
Dividends of U.S./Qatar Military Alliance 
 Although Qatar is not a democratic country in the liberal sense and 
thus hardly a symbol for liberal democratic ideals in practice that is worthy 
of universal admiration and attraction, it still has some indirect hard-power 
that that makes it attractive within its sphere of influence in the Middle East. 
This is because, “Military power can also be an attraction to those who wish 
to be on the winning side - or at least wish to avoid being on the losing side. 
Military units can be used for disaster relief”104. In this regard, Qatar’s 
military alliance with the U.S and its hosting of the U.S. military base, 
CENTCOM has bolstered its image in the region to the point of mute 
attraction and awe which constitute soft power. For example, the U.S/Qatar 
military alliance enabled Qatar to engage in military humanitarian 
intervention in Libya, addition to the hard power participation in the 
overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. 
                                                 
101 Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 616 (2008), 94 
102  Ibid 
103J. Nye, Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics, p.11.  
104 Dan Blatt, review of The Paradox of American Power by Joseph Nye, Futurecasts 4 
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 Furthermore, it inoculates Qatar against any immediate regional 
threat and preserves the power and authority of the Al-Thani dynasty as 
would be provocateurs would have to contend with the full might of the sole 
Super-power in the world which has vested military and economic interest in 
Qatar. Second, the U.S military alliance also enhances the image of Qatar 
regionally and worldwide as a stable country that has the approval and ear of 
the sole Super-power thereby enabling Qatar to leverage this benefit into soft 
power influence in places where Qatar can serve as an interlocutor between 
the U.S and its Middle Eastern and Muslim friends, who are wary and 
suspicious of U.S motives.  
 
Effective Distribution of National Wealth 
 Qatar stands out in a region where there is massive disenchantment 
against the ruling elites for their failure to effectively manage their respective 
economies and distribute immense wealth from oil sales. It is therefore not 
surprising that Qatar remains unscathed by the Arab Spring phenomenon. 
Through this default mode, Qatar has become the proverbial one-eyed man 
in the kingdom of the blind, worthy of everyone’s leadership.  
Qatar is blessed with the double fortune of immense natural resources 
and a small population which has enabled the leadership to formulate an 
uncontested domestic and foreign policy at home. According to the 2008 
Economist intelligence report, Qatar had a GDP per capita per person of a 
whopping $448, 246. This level of wealth has insulated Qatar from the socio-
economic discontent that has led to the political turmoil of the Arab Spring. 
The Qatari state has proven itself to be an effective distributor of wealth to 
its citizens through public sector employment, grants of land to citizens and 
the provision of subsidized goods and services. This is in contrast to other 
countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman where a 
complex demographic mix and increasing population continue to pose a 
strain on wealth distribution105.  
 Indeed there is evidence to show that Qataris are content with the 
wealth distribution. According to the results of the third annual Arab Youth 
Survey published in March 2011 by the Dubai based Public relations firm, 
Asda’a Burson-Marstellar, the percentage of respondents who ranked 
democracy as important had fallen from 68% in 2008 to just 33% in 2010. 
Instead, two-thirds of the respondents placed a higher premium on stability 
and living in safe neighborhoods. These results show that Qataris are content 
with what they are currently receiving and have made a rational calculation 
                                                 
105 Kristain Ulrichsen. “Qatar: Emergence of a Regional Power with International Reach.” 
E-International Relations, 2102,  http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/23/qatar-emergence-of-a-
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that the cost of rocking the status quo was not worth the hassle. It is therefore 
not surprising that the Arab Spring has passed Qatar by.106  Indeed, this 
contentment quiets the home front and gives the government the breathing 
space to be more active in foreign affairs. 
 However, Nye warns that military and economic superiority is 
frequently not enough to achieve a desired outcome as history does not 
always favor the side with the biggest battalions or the deepest pockets. 
Furthermore, the player with the strongest power hand is not always destined 
to carry the day. Therefore, "Converting resources into realized power in the 
sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and 
skillful leadership. Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently 
misjudge -- witness Japan and Germany in 1941 or Saddam Hussein in 
1990."107 
 
Progressive Higher Education System 
 One of the major sources of attraction that has traditionally enabled 
the U.S and its western allies to exercise soft power is a strong and reputable 
higher education system that attracts thousands of people to study in U.S and 
other western educational institutions. Over the years, the U.S has been 
offering several scholarships to other nationalities via institutional programs 
such as the Fulbright and Marshall Programs. These are aided by other non-
governmental programs such as the Ford foundation and the George Soros 
financed Open Society program. It is instructive to know that former UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan was a beneficiary of a Ford foundation 
scholarship just as President Obama’s father was in the sixties. It is no 
coincidence that the U.S strongly backed the candidacy of Kofi Annan, an 
MIT Alumnus, for the post of the U.N Secretary General. Having been 
educated in the U.S, Washington considered him a known entity in contrast 
to his unknown fellow African competitor, the former foreign minister of 
Tanzania, Ahmed Salim Salim.  
 The foreign policy benefits of such educational opportunities for host 
governments are immeasurable. First, higher educational institutions offer a 
non controversial avenue to shape the hearts and minds of future elites from 
other countries who will assume leadership positions in their respective 
countries. Such elites are more likely to have forged strong ties with their 
counterparts in wherever they received their education and are more 
amendable to deal making rather than confrontation. Second, educational 
opportunities help demystify the fear of the other as both U.S and 
international students are able to overcome entrenched stereotypes and 
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misperceptions about each other through their interaction on various 
campuses. This is helpful for future cooperation between the host country 
and the countries of origin of the students. Nye points out that personal 
contact serves a vital channel for soft power. For example, "Most of China's 
leaders have a son or daughter educated in the States who can portray a 
realistic view of the United States that is often at odds with the caricatures in 
official propaganda”108. 
 Thanks to its huge oil and gas revenue, Qatar continues to invest 
heavily in the improvement of education, making the country the world 
leader in terms of the percentage of GDP spent on education. In addition, the 
literacy rate stands at 93 percent and 88.6 percent of girls are able to read and 
write, which is the highest percentage in the Arab world.109 In the last few 
years, Qatar has aggressively courted and has been successful in getting 
prestigious U.S universities to open branches in Qatar where they offer the 
same degrees as the parent universities in the U.S. In pursuance of this 
strategy of attracting foreign universities, Qatar has built an education city in 
order to concentrate all the Universities in the same area. Notable among 
these Universities are Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University, 
Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell Medical College and 
Texas A & M University.110 
 These institutions have become very popular in the Middle East as it 
is obvious that for these universities to be viable in the long run, they would 
have to go beyond the small pool of prospective Qatari applicants and 
instead tap into the greater Middle East for prospects. Herein lays the soft 
power impact of Qatar on Middle Easterners and other foreigners who are 
attracted by the aforementioned universities in Qatar. Many of the Middle 
Eastern students are going to be the elites in their respective countries and as 
such the relationships that they forge with Qataris and other international 
students’ coupled with their live experiences living in Qatar are going to 
make them much more tolerant of Qatari foreign policies in the future if not 
susceptible. Furthermore, schools in Qatar’s education city serve as a 
credible alternative for higher education for Arabs who are hesitant to pursue 
higher education in the West either as a result of visa restrictions or cultural 
considerations. This adds to the growing prestige of Qatar in the Middle East 
and their ability to shape the minds of current and future generations of 
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Middle Eastern and Muslim elites. It is instructive to also note that most of 
the faculty members at these universities are Westerners who are primed to 
shape the hearts and minds of future Arab leaders towards moderation, a 
foreign policy goal of Qatar.  
 It is noteworthy that during the Cold War, U.S Soft power influences 
in the form of cultural exchanges and the thousands of international students 
who came to study in the U.S created a significant advantage for the U.S 
over its Cold War adversaries. Nye has observed that some of the pioneer 
international students from the Soviet Union played a pivotal role in the 
peaceful demise of the Soviet Union as they eventually rose to positions of 
influence upon their return home and began challenging the status quo from 
within.111 
 Apart from helping in the molding of the future elites of the Middle 
East, Qatar is also shaping the foreign policy agenda of the region by inviting 
scholars and academics to attend conferences that focus on priority issues of 
the Qatari government. For example, in his capacity as Chair of the Qatar 
Foundation, H.E. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Ali-Al Thani, holds annual summits 
in Doha to discuss new ideas about innovations, inventions and technologies. 
The theme of the 2009 inaugural summit was global education and how 
people around the world should cooperate to achieve something great.112 
Participants of these summits represent leading and emerging voices from 
their countries and they are not impervious to presentations from like-minded 
people and their Qatari hosts.  
 
Aljazeera Media Influence 
 Unlike the U.S and other major European powers that have are 
widely associated with certain desirable ideals and values which enable them 
to exert soft power influence around the world, Qatar until recently was a 
relatively unknown country. However, the establishment of the Aljazeera 
media empire by the Qatari government in 1996 has given the country 
unprecedented exposure in the world as Qatar is now synonymous with the 
famous Aljazeera brand which is now universally recognizable. The ability 
of any country to exert soft power influence by promoting its ideals or values 
depends largely on its ability to tout the utility of the proposed ideals via a 
medium that the targeted audience trusts or derives its information from. 
Over the years, the U.S and Great Britain have had major successes 
promoting their ideals around the world via their dominance of the major 
media sources such as CNN, BBC and Voice of America just to mention a 
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112 World Innovation Summit for Education, “WISE Initiative”. WISE, N.D., 
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few. However, the duopoly of American and British Media dominance has 
been broken by Aljazeera since its inceptions in 1996 and it remains a force 
in influencing the attitudes and minds of people in the Middle East.  
 In fact Hillary Clinton in a March 2, 20011, Congressional testimony 
cited the increasing influence of Al Jazeera in her argument for more 
Congressional funding to execute what she termed the “information war” 
which she declared the U.S was losing. Acknowledging the soft power 
influence of Aljazeera, she testified as follows: 
Al Jazeera has been the leader in that are literally changing people’s 
minds and attitudes. And like it or hate it, it is really effective...In fact 
viewership of Al Jazeera is going up in the United States because it’s 
real news. You may not agree with it, but you feel like you’re getting 
real news around the clock instead of a million commercials and, you 
know, arguments between talking heads and the kind of stuff that we 
do on our news which, you know, is not particularly informative to 
us, let alone foreigners.”113 
 Aljazeera has been providing its audience with different perspectives 
on the ‘hot button’ global issues which counters the western news media’s 
narrative thereby carving a niche for itself as captured by its motto “The 
View and the Other Point of View”. In addition, Aljazeera has built a 
reputation for breaking the media norms of the Arab world which shies away 
from critiquing or questioning officialdom. Instead, the network is widely 
praised for giving opposition groups the forum to condemn their repressive 
governments.”114  
 The international profile of Qatar in the midst of the Arab Spring has 
been greatly enhanced, particularly in the Middle East as a result of the 
coverage of Aljazeera. The average man on the streets of Tunisia, Libya, 
Egypt and Syria is more likely to view Qatar as siding with the powerless 
because its news organization is telling and showing the world their struggles 
for freedom and democracy. Buttressing this point, Kinninmont, notes that 
“Al-Jazeera now wins global accolades for its cutting-edge coverage of the 
Arab Spring. It has been the only Arab broadcaster to make serious inroads 
                                                 
113 Kirit.Radia,“Sec. of State Hillary Clinton: Aljazeera is ‘Real News’, U.S. Losing 
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with western audiences, challenging the stereotype that globalization must 
mean westernization.”115 
 Aljazeera has diversified its coverage to include sports, 
documentaries, local news and children’s programs in addition to its highly 
acclaimed English-language current-events channel that features an 
ensemble of top notch Western journalists. Although the network may be 
popular in the State Department’s cafeteria in Washington, the network is 
unfairly tagged as a promoter of jihad in certain quarters of American society 
thereby limiting its expansion in the American media landscape.116 However, 
the recent acquisition of Current TV by Aljazeera offers the possibility of 
Aljazeera gaining about 40 million American customers for its proposed 
Aljazeera America Network.117 The ability of Aljazeera to broadcast into the 
homes of millions of Americans may go a long way to change the attitudes 
of Americans towards Muslims and the Middle East in general. If this 
happens, it will be a novelty in the sense that it will be the first time that a 
smaller country via the power of its media empire is exerting soft power 
influence on the super-power of the world.  
 
“Carrots” for Soft Power 
 “Carrot” Diplomacy 
 Qatar uses its enormous wealth from natural resources as a tool for its 
foreign policy in order to build its regional and international profile. 
However, Qatar lacks the organic influence that other countries have over 
others such as Saudi's religious influence, America democratic influence and 
China's economic influence. As a result of this, Qatar is increasingly relying 
on its financial muscle when mediating conflicts by promising huge sums of 
money after a peaceful settlement to build up infrastructure and so on. I term 
this “Carrot Diplomacy.” For war torn and cash strapped countries, Qatar’s 
offer of “carrots” for peace is a noble cause. 
 In order to achieve its diplomatic objectives, Qatar relies on two 
types of diplomacy. The first is diplomatic mediation, which seeks to project 
an image of Qatar’s as a neutral intermediary that can be relied upon and 
interested in peace and stability in the region. Qatar uses diplomacy to 
maximize its interests and influence on countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, 
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Guardian, 2013,  www.guardian.co.uk/.../2013/feb/.../qatar-tiny-gulf-state-global-force (20 
June 2013) 
116 The Economist, “Al Jazeera Must do Better: The Arabs’ Premier Television Network 
Bids for American Viewers,” The Economist, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21569429-arabs-premier-
television-network-bids-american-viewers-must-do-better 
117 Ibid 
European Scientific Journal   November 2013  edition vol.9, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
358 
Yemen and Sudan that have traditionally fallen under Saudi Arabian 
influence thereby upending the mantle of domination and influence of a 
strong regional hegemon. 
 The second mode of diplomacy employed by Qatar is public 
diplomacy through the media, where it presents Aljazeera as the voice of the 
people and an open platform for the voiceless. Diplomatic and public 
diplomacy is often integrated whereby Al Jazeera highlights conflicts that 
Qatar mediates. Most of Qatar’s diplomatic interventions are aimed at 
defusing crisis, or relieving tension, and not necessarily resolving the the 
conflict. However, Qatar’s modus operandi is being tested by the Arab 
Spring whereby Qatar is now compelled to shirk its impartiality cloak and 
instead take sides. Thus, Qatar has attained a respectable regional and 
international reputation that does not commensurate with its small size and 
limited military capability all through a deliberate policy where it uses its 
tremendous resources as carrots and sticks.  
 As part of its public diplomacy strategy, Qatar pursue a deliberate 
type of diplomacy which has been described as “Niche Diplomacy, “defined 
as the targeting of “resources in specific areas able to generate returns worth 
having.”118 In line with this strategy, Qatar has devoted resources in six areas 
with the hope of exerting soft power influence to solve some of the most 
vexing conflicts in the Middle East. The first strategy is serving as an 
unbiased interlocutor between two conflicting parties that Qatar has good 
relations with. In pursuance of this Qatar offered to open an office for the 
Taliban in Doha in order to facilitate peace talks between the Taliban and the 
Karzai government and also between the Taliban and the Americans.  
 The second strategy involves Qatar using its good offices to mediate 
intra faction conflicts by hosting reconciliation meetings among feuding 
factions in the region. For example, Qatar has hosted several reconciliation 
meetings between Hamas and Fatah in a bid to unite them for the much 
bigger challenge of speaking with one voice against Israel and ending the 
destruction intra faction political turf wars that undermines Palestinian unity. 
Also in November 2012, Qatar hosted a conference in its capital Doha which 
brought all the opposition forces against the Assad regime. At the conference 
an agreement was signed among the Syrian opposition to form a Syrian 
National Coalition of the Opposition and Revolutionary Forces in a bid to 
better coordinate their resistance against the Assad regime.  
 The third strategy is that Qatar hosts big multilateral conferences as it 
did in hosting the largest conference on United Nations Convention on 
Climate change from November 26- December 6, 2012 with about 17,000 
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participants. Prior to this, Qatar hosted the now famous WTO Ministerial 
Conference known as the Doha round of talks in 2001 which sought to 
commit all countries to negotiate for open agricultural and manufacturing 
markets and enhanced intellectual property rights protections.  
 The fifth strategy which is perhaps the most controversial is Qatar 
increasingly becoming the preferred destination for many political dissents in 
the region sometimes to the discomfort and displeasure of some of its 
international and regional allies. For example Qatar hosts Khaled Meshaal 
the political head of Hamas after the latter abandoned his patron Assad in the 
wake of the Syrian uprising. Although the Qatari move has been interpreted 
as an attempt to wean Hamas off its Iranian/Syria influence and thereby 
moderate its outlook, Tel Aviv and Washington D.C are quite wary. 
Similarly, Qatar host a number of prominent Islamic Brotherhood dissidents 
that have been expelled from Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E creating a sour 
spot in an otherwise excellent relationship among the three nations. On the 
other hand, Qatar has dangled the prospect of a comfortable asylum to key 
actors in some of the conflicts in the Middle East in order to entice them to 
defect and assist in ending a conflict. For example, in August 2012 the 
former Prime Minister of Syria Riad Hijab defected from the regime and 
headed quickly to Qatar. In addition, Qatar granted Asylum to the former 
foreign minister of Libya in the Gaddafi Regime Mousa Kousa in the heat of 
NATO’s attack on Gaddafi’s forces.  
 The last strategy involves Qatar projecting its diplomatic efforts 
through its Aljazeera network and highlighting its mediation initiatives to the 
region and the world at large. This goes a long way to enhance the reputation 
of Qatar in the world and the public opinion in places where Qatar is 
mediating peace. According to Nye “Shaping public opinion becomes even 
more important where authoritarian governments have been replaced by new 
democracies.”119 
 
Sports 
 Sports are non-controversial tools that bring nations together and 
enhance the reputation and image of countries that excel in them or host 
successful events. That is why many countries have traditionally invested 
heavily in the preparation of their athletes for major worldwide sporting 
events. For example, in the height of the Cold War, the Olympics became a 
proxy battle field between the East and West to the point where some of the 
Eastern bloc members such as Eastern Germany deemed it necessary to dope 
their athletes in order to demonstrate athletic superiority and in extension, 
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ideological superiority over their Western German counterparts. The bidding 
to host major sporting events such as the Olympic Games and the Football 
World Cup is a fiercely contested process even though many host countries 
are unable to recoup all their financial investments after hosting these events. 
An intangible and an unquantifiable factor behind the fierce competition to 
host such major sporting events is the international prestige and stature 
gained in successfully hosting major sporting events. This goes a long way to 
make the host country or the athletically successful country very attractive to 
other countries, a major coup for soft power. 
 Although Qatar is far from being a major world power in any sport, it 
has been aggressively seeking and successfully hosting major sporting 
events. It successfully hosted the XV Asian Games in 2006 and recently won 
the bid to host the 2022 World Cup amid allegations of vote buying which 
threatens to undermine this tremendous accomplishment. Winning the right 
to host the World Cup has greatly enhanced the image and reputation of 
Qatar in the Middle East and among Muslims around the world, just as South 
Africa’s hosting of the 2010 World Cup was a major source of pride for the 
entire African continent. 
  A successful hosting will further cement the reputation and level of 
Qatari attractiveness in the Middle Eastern region thereby boosting its 
influence in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general. When 
countries host major sports events, the best of their culture and hospitality is 
also on display and depending on how attractive it is, it can greatly enhance 
the image of the host nation. One cannot under-estimate the impact of the 
captivating acrobatics and fire displays during the Beijing Olympics and the 
James Bond themed cameo of the Queen of England during the London 
Olympics. Joseph Nye has identified culture as one of the main resources of 
soft-power, particularly in places where it is attractive.120 
 Qatar is also using sports to build its soft power beyond its shores 
through sponsorship deals with famous European sporting giants and 
outright purchase of major European football clubs. For example, in 2010, 
FC Barcelona accepted the Qatar Foundation logo in place of the UNICEF 
logo ending more than a century of tradition by signing a commercial shirt 
sponsorship package worth $190 million dollars. In 2011, Qatar also 
purchased the iconic but cash strapped Parisian football club, Paris Saint-
German. Thus using its immense financial resources to invest in an 
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immensely popular global sport, Qatar is tactfully increasingly its global 
profile via football diplomacy.121 
 Drawing a parallel, with the long held soft power advantage of 
American culture in the world, Coruzzi posits that Qatari investment in 
football will serve “a similar purpose to that of Hollywood. Sports, like 
movies, are extremely popular in all ranks of society. Just like the world 
learned to love America through Marlon Brando and Marilyn Monroe, so too 
will the world learn about Qatar through Paris-Saint Germain.”122 
 
Foreign Aid 
 The world giving index 2011, ranked Qatar in 20th place based on 
the percentage of population giving and the first in terms of the Middle 
Eastern region and Arab countries.123 Countries that integrate substantial 
foreign aid in their foreign policy generally generate positive goodwill as it 
enhances their reputation among the beneficiaries. In international relations, 
today’s aid beneficiary is a potential future ally via soft power influence and 
as Nye puts it “When countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of 
others, they encounter less resistance to their wishes."124 According to 
Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Ministry, the total developmental and 
humanitarian aid given by the Qatari government between 2010-2011 
amounted to over 1 billion U.S dollars.125 
 Notable among Qatar’s giving is a one billion dollar loan to Tunisia 
with a 2.5% interest rate and a promise to employ 20,000 Tunisians to work 
in Qatar.126 Similarly, Qatar has decided to invest 29 million Euros in 
subsidized housing in Tunisia which will provide 810 housing units in 
Sejoumi in the Tunis governorate.127 This aid comes at an opportune time for 
Tunisia which went through a tumultuous democratic transition sparked 
primarily by agitations for more employment opportunities and democratic 
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reforms. Qatar’s financial assistance and offer of employment for Tunisians 
will go a long way, to ingratiate the Qatari government to Tunisians. This 
will make the Tunisian government and public opinion more susceptible to 
Qatari influence because the latter will be viewed as having demonstrated 
commitment to the welfare of Tunisians in times of need.  
 In addition, Qatar has given cash strapped Egypt a loan facility of 3 
billion dollars128 and pledged five free cargoes of liquefied petroleum gas to 
assist Egypt this summer.129 This aid from Qatar was aimed at shoring up the 
Islamic Brotherhood government of Morsi, a major ally of Qatar at a time 
that the West was hesitant to grant the Morsi government financial assistance 
pending some political reforms. By providing financial assistance to Egypt at 
a critical time of need, Qatar was positioned to influence Egyptian politics 
and at the same time ingratiate itself to Egyptian public opinion in the post-
Mubarak era. According to Nye “Shaping public opinion becomes even more 
important where authoritarian governments have been replaced by new 
democracies.”130 However, the toppling of Morsi could seriously undermine 
Qatar’s image in Egypt as the former would be viewed negatively for 
investing in a failed cause.  
 Qatar’s indiscriminate humanitarian assistance could yield strong 
foreign relations dividends from the recipient governments and countries in 
the foreseeable future as Qatar will become an attractive country to deal 
with. The provision of $100 million dollars assistance to the U.S in the wake 
of a devastating natural disaster such as Katrina will help soften the image of 
Qatar among the U.S public which is very hostile towards Arabs and 
suspicious of Muslims as a result of 9/11. For risk averse and opinion poll 
conscious American politicians, this will reduce the political transaction cost 
of engaging Qatar in foreign policy issues since the former can now show to 
the American public a tangible deed of the Qatari government to make the 
case that Qatar is an American ally worthy of engagement. Nye posits that 
"in democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political 
leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in 
autocracies".131  
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Challenges to Qatari Soft Power 
Promoting Values without Practicing 
 On a global scale, Qatar is not faring well in terms of practicing 
democracy internally and serving as a good democratic role model in the 
Middle East. According to the 2010 Democracy Index released by the 
Economic Intelligence Unit, Qatar ranked 137 out of 167. A contributory 
factor to Qatar’s low democratic ranking is its 0 rating in electoral process 
and pluralism.132 This ranking shows that indeed Qatar is an authoritarian 
regime and lacks the moral authority to be the torch bearer of democracy in 
the Middle East.  
 During an official visit to the White House, President Obama praised 
then Emir of Qatar for his diplomatic and military support in toppling the 
Gaddafi regime. However, has acknowledged Qatar’s awkward position as a 
flawed messenger of democracy, by observing that “He, Al-Thani, is a very 
influential guy but he himself is not reforming significantly.”133  
 According to Nye promoting a set of political values could be a major 
booster to soft power influence “when the promoter adheres to them at home 
and abroad” and pursues “foreign policies regarded as legitimate and having 
moral authority”134 In order for Qatar’s democratic advocacy to be effective 
and persuasive for its recipients, Qatar would have to lead by example by 
practicing what it preaches. It is far difficult and unattractive to promote a 
policy based on do as I say, not as I do. As the cliché goes, action speaks 
louder than words.  
 
Over Reliance on “Carrots” and Backlash 
 Qatar risks a global backlash even in recipient countries of Qatari 
investments and foreign aid if it is perceived as buying influence. While the 
elites in countries where Qatar is investing or donating money may court or 
welcome Qatari money, a segment of the population may resent this and 
view this as an attempt by Qatar to prop up a political faction within the 
country. At worse, the sheer volume of Qatar’s investment could unnerve the 
sensibilities of domestic actors already blaming global forces for their 
economic plight in a difficult global economic environment. Under such 
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circumstances, Qatar risks losing the hearts and minds of the people that they 
hope to court for future engagements. 
 There is growing resentment throughout Europe and the Middle East 
as a result of recent Qatari investments. In the Middle East, there are 
grumblings against Qatar for purchasing the downfall of Gadhafi among 
others. After initially hailing Qatar for its role in toppling Arab Dictators, 
protestors in Libya burnt the Qatari flag for funding the Muslim Brotherhood 
there. After giving Egypt $3 billion dollars, some Egyptians burned Qatari 
flag and accused their government of selling the country to Qatar. 
Meanwhile rumors continue to swirl among Egyptians that Qatar might 
purchase the Suez Canal in spite of numerous denials from both 
governments. Furthermore, anti-Qatar demonstrations flared up after Qatar 
promised a $1 billion dollar loan prompting an embarrassed Tunisian 
government to rebuke its citizens for insulting a country that is helping 
them.135 
  In France, the backlash against Qatari investments is being 
spearheaded at the elite level among far right politicians who are particularly 
incensed about Qatar’s plans to invest in low-income “banlieues”. Marine Le 
Pen, the leader of the far right party, Front National who scored about 20% 
of the votes in the last Presidential elections has labeled Qatari investment 
plans as an “Islamic Trojan Horse.” This has resonated with a segment of 
French citizens in the midst of economic and political anxieties.136 
 
Limitations of “Carrot” Diplomacy 
 Qatar is not universally identified with a particular set of values or 
ideals that others will voluntarily embrace without inducements and this can 
make their soft power influence fleeting. Buttressing this point Nye posits 
that "When you can get others to admire your ideals and to do want what you 
want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them 
in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and 
many values like democracy and human rights, and individual opportunities 
are deeply seductive.137 
 Many people imitate Americans not because they are coaxed to do so 
but they are motivated to do so and they are willing to learn and adopt 
American ways of thinking or doing things because they think it's a better 
option. However, what will happen if Qatar is no longer able to deliver the 
“carrots” when it faces economic crises as it is cyclical with resource 
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dependent economies? Will countries welcome Qatar to mediate their 
problems and will the influence of Qatar remain the same or fade away when 
it can no longer deliver the “carrots"? Nye argues that a powerful country 
should set the values and others would follow without any external influence 
and notes that motivation plays a major role in soft power.138 Citing the 
United States as a case study, Nye points out that the U.S set the standards 
for democracy and a set of ideals romanticized around the world as the 
“American dream” for people to follow.139  
 
Qatar’s Questionable Friends         
Qatar has cultivated and built strong relationships with diverse 
Islamist groups across the Middle East and exert considerable influence on 
them primarily through the provision of “carrots”. These groups include 
Muslim brotherhood branches in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and to some extent 
Turkey and Hamas in Gaza. In addition, Qatar host a number of 
brotherhood/Islamist dissidents from neighboring Gulf countries such Saudi 
Arabia and the U.A.E much to the consternation of these countries. With 
Qatar overtly providing financial and moral support to Islamists in the 
region, any deviation from democratic norms by the latter regimes will 
severely dent the international image of Qatar thereby undermining their soft 
power credentials. 
 If Qatar’s Islamist allies are able to consolidate democratic ideals and 
meet the aspirations of their people, then Qatar’s image will be enhanced in 
the region and become a major source of attraction, a sine-qua non for soft 
power influence. However, recent events in Egypt where millions of 
Egyptians marched on the streets and forced the ouster of Brotherhood 
President Morsi for betraying their democratic aspirations, does not bode 
well for the image of Qatar in Egypt and beyond. In this regard, Nye warns 
that “The reputation and credibility of a state or group seeking to exert soft-
power influence also matters particularly because of the “paradox of 
plenty”39 F140. Thus any information perceived as propaganda may not just be 
treated with contempt but may also be counterproductive if it undermines the 
reputation of the provider of the information.40F141 
 
The Perils of Creeping Hard Power 
 As Nye points out, one of the resources of soft power is foreign 
policy if it is viewed as having moral authority. He adds that “When our 
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policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is 
enhanced".142 In this regard, Qatar has earned tremendous amount of 
goodwill in the Middle East for its role in defeating the Ghadhafi regime and 
humanitarian and military support for the Syrian rebels against the Assad 
regime. However, such unbridled use of hard power could backfire and could 
damage Qatar’s reputation in the long run as there have been credible reports 
of atrocities committed by some of the Qatari backed rebels in Syria. There 
are also serious fears that Qatar may be supporting the most radical elements 
of the rebels with illiberal motives with ties with Al Qaeda. This fear was 
conveyed by U.S President Barack Obama to the Emir of Qatar during an 
April 23, 2013 meeting in which the former is “said to have spoken in blunt 
terms about Qatar’s support for jihadists and to have warned that Qatari 
backing of Al-Qaeda-like groups would pose a direct challenge to the 
national-security interests of the U.S. The emir was said to have agreed with 
the president wholeheartedly on the matter.”143 
  
Conclusion 
 Qatar will be better served by preserving its main sources of 
attraction in order to continue exercising soft power influence in its sphere of 
influence. In this regard, it should re-align its regional foreign policy goals 
with that of its major security benefactor the U.S. by re-evaluating its support 
for Islamist groups that the U.S is suspicious of or disapproves. In order to be 
taken seriously as a champion of the movement for democratic change that is 
currently sweeping across the region, Qatar should accelerate the pace of its 
own long over-due democratic reforms by at least releasing all political 
dissidents and permitting elective municipal and parliamentary elections with 
real legislative powers. This should be supplemented with labor reforms for 
the millions of migrant laborers that are fueling Qatar’s economic and 
construction boom. Failure to do this could put Qatar under unnecessary 
international scrutiny that could undermine its image and thus soft power 
capability as it prepares to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022. 
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